How long is the apology of socrates

Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or any other animals? Yes, certainly; whether you and Anytus say yes or no, that is no matter. And now, Meletus, I must ask you another question: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; for that is a question which may be easily answered. Do not the good [ agathoi ] do their neighbors good [ agathon ], and the bad do them evil?

Socrates [25d] And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend; the law [ nomos ] requires you to answer—does anyone like to be injured? Socrates And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

Socrates But you have just admitted that the good [ agathoi ] do their neighbors good [ agathon ], and the evil do them evil. But either I do not corrupt them, [26a] or I corrupt them unintentionally, so that on either view of the case you lie.

If my offence is unintentional, the law [ nomos ] has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; whereas you hated to converse with me or teach me, but you indicted me in this court, where the law [ nomos ] demands not instruction, but punishment.

I have shown, Athenians, as I was saying, [26b] that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state [ polis ] acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies [ daimones ] in their stead.

These are the lessons which corrupt the youth, as you say. Socrates Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! Or, do you mean to say that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism? Socrates [26d] That is an extraordinary statement, Meletus.

Why do you say that? Do you mean that I do not believe in the divinity of the sun or moon, which is the common creed of all men? Meletus I assure you, judges, that he does not believe in them; for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth. Socrates Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras; and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them ignorant to such a degree as not to know that those doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras of Klazomenai, who is full of them.

And these are the doctrines which the youth are said to learn of Socrates, when there are not infrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre price of admission one drachma at the most ; [26e] and they might cheaply purchase them, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father such eccentricities. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god? Socrates You are a liar, Meletus, not believed even by yourself.

For I cannot help thinking, O men of Athens, that Meletus is full of insolence [ hubris ] and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer.

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings? Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please answer the next question: [27c] Can a man believe in things having to do with daimones , and not in the daimones themselves?

Socrates I am glad that I have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court; nevertheless you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in things related to daimones— things new or old, no matter—at any rate, I believe in things related to daimones , as you say and swear in the affidavit. But if I believe in things related to daimones , I must believe in daimones or gods themselves—is not that true? Yes, that is true, for I may assume that your silence gives assent to that.

Now what are daimones? Socrates But this is just the ingenious riddle [ ainigma ] of which I was speaking: the daimones are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in daimones. For if the daimones are the illegitimate children of gods, whether by the Nymphs or by any other mothers, as is thought, that, as all men will allow, necessarily implies the existence of their parents.

Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been devised by you as a way to charge me. I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus. Any elaborate defense is unnecessary; but as I was saying before, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed; of that I am certain—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good [ agathos ] men, and will probably be the death of many more; [28b] there is no danger of my being the last of them.

Perhaps someone might say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of pursuing such a goal in life, which is likely to cause you to die right now? Rather, he should only consider whether in doing anything he is doing things that are just [ dikaia ] or unjust [ adika ], acting the part of a good [ agathos ] man or of a bad [ kakos ] one. His mother, goddess that she was, had said to him, when he was showing his eagerness to slay Hector, something like this, I think: My child, if you avenge the slaying of your comrade [ hetairos ] Patroklos and kill Hector, you will die yourself.

And this is the point in which, as I think, I am superior to men in general, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself more sophos than other men—that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether god or man, is evil [ kakos ] and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil.

Are you not ashamed of this? And this I should say to everyone whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien [ xenos ], but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For this is the command of the god, as I would have you know; and I believe that to this day no greater good [ agathos ] has ever happened in the state than my service to the god. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my influence is ruinous indeed.

But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; [30c] but whatever you do, know that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an agreement between us that you should hear me out. And I think that what I am going to say will do you good: for I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I beg that you will not do this.

I would have you know that, if you kill such a one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Meletus and Anytus will not injure me: they cannot; for it is not in the nature of things [ themis ] [30d] that a bad man should injure a better than himself.

And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the god, or lightly reject his boon by condemning me. I am that gadfly which the god has given the state and [31a] all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. And as you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you to spare me.

I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping; and you may think that if you were to strike me dead, as Anytus advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless the god in his care of you gives you another gadfly. And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in that: but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say [31c] that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; they have no witness of that.

Someone may wonder why I go about in private, giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. You have often heard me speak [31d] of something related to the gods and to the daimones , a voice, which comes to me, and is the thing that Meletus ridicules in the indictment.

This thing I have had ever since I was a child: it is a voice which comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never commands me to do anything, and this is what stands in the way of being engaged in matters of the state.

And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in these matters, I would have perished long ago and done no good either to you [31e] or to myself. Let me tell you a passage of my own life, which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that if I had not yielded I should have died at once. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon of Salamis, as they wanted to execute him.

This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; [32d] and then I showed, not in words only, but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my only fear was the fear of doing an unrighteous [non- dikaios ] or unholy thing.

For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples or to any other.

For the truth is that I have no regular disciples: but if anyone likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he may freely come. But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? And this is a duty which the god has imposed upon me, as I am assured by oracles [ manteia ], visions, and in every sort of way in which the will of divine power was ever signified to anyone.

Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age [33e] and of the same deme with myself; and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettos, who is the father of Aeschines—he is present; and also there is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me.

There is Nicostratus the son of Theodotides, and the brother of Theodotus now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to stop him ; and there is Paralus the son of Demodokos, who had a brother Theages; [34a] and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see.

I might mention a great many others, any of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let him still produce them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him.

And let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort that he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the destroyer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; [34b] not the corrupted youth only—there might have been a motive for that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives.

Why should they too support me with their testimony? Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is nearly all the defense that I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps this may come into his mind, and he may be set against me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at this. O Athenians, three in number, one of whom is growing up, and the two others are still young; and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question, of which I will not now speak.

But my reason simply is that I feel such conduct to be discreditable to myself, and you, and the whole state. One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, whether deserved or not, ought not to debase himself. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who are of reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show that you are more inclined to condemn, not the man who is quiet, but the man who gets up a doleful scene, and makes the city ridiculous.

But, setting aside the question of dishonor, [35c] there seems to be something wrong in petitioning a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal instead of informing and convincing him.

For his duty is, not to make a present of justice [ dikaios ], but to give judgment [ krinein ]; and he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws [ nomos ], and not according to his own good pleasure; and neither he nor we should get into the habit of perjuring ourselves — there can be no piety in that. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and convict myself, in my own defense, of not believing in them.

But that is not the case; for I do believe that there are gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to the god I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best [ aristos ] for you and me. I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against me would have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted.

And I may say that I have escaped Meletus. And I may say more; for without the assistance of Anytus and Lycon, [36b] he would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae, as is evident. And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is that which I ought to pay or to endure [ paskhein ]?

What shall be done to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many care about—wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and speaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. What shall be done to such a one? What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, who desires leisure that he may instruct you?

There can be no more fitting reward than maintenance in the Prytaneion, 2 O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. Perhaps you may think that I am braving you in saying this, as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But that is not the case.

I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged anyone, although I cannot convince you of that—for we have had a short conversation only; but if there were a law [ nomos ] at Athens, such as there is in other cities, [37b] that a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you; but now the time is too short.

I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil [ kakos ], or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes?

When I do not know whether death is a good [ agathos ] or an evil [ kakos ], why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? Or shall the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and I cannot pay. And if I say exile and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix , I must indeed be blinded by the love of life if I were to consider that when you, who are my own citizens, [37d] cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you would want to have done with them, others are likely to endure me.

No, indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, living in ever-changing exile, and always being driven out! These activities earned him much admiration amongst the youth of Athens, but much hatred and anger from the people he embarrassed.

He cites their contempt as the reason for his being put on trial. Socrates then proceeds to interrogate Meletus, the man primarily responsible for bringing Socrates before the jury. This is the only instance in The Apology of the elenchus, or cross-examination, which is so central to most Platonic dialogues. His conversation with Meletus, however, is a poor example of this method, as it seems more directed toward embarrassing Meletus than toward arriving at the truth.

In a famous passage, Socrates likens himself to a gadfly stinging the lazy horse which is the Athenian state. Without him, Socrates claims, the state is liable to drift into a deep sleep, but through his influence--irritating as it may be to some--it can be wakened into productive and virtuous action. Socrates is found guilty by a narrow margin and is asked to propose a penalty. Socrates jokingly suggests that if he were to get what he deserves, he should be honored with a great meal for being of such service to the state.

On a more serious note, he rejects prison and exile, offering perhaps instead to pay a fine. When the jury rejects his suggestion and sentences him to death, Socrates stoically accepts the verdict with the observation that no one but the gods know what happens after death and so it would be foolish to fear what one does not know. He also warns the jurymen who voted against him that in silencing their critic rather than listening to him, they have harmed themselves much more than they have harmed him.

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